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TRIAL TACTICS

Inconsistent Jury Verdicts
BY STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG

J

uries are supposed to render verdicts that are
internally consistent. At times they do not. The
law is clear that a defendant cannot set aside a
conviction on the grounds that a verdict is inconsistent. (Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393
(1932) (“Consistency in the verdict is not necessary.”).) But what if a trial judge explicitly instructs
a jury that its verdict need not be consistent? The
answer is provided in United States v. Moran-Toala,
726 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2013).

The Facts

The case began in 2005 when Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents began investigating
a Delta Airlines baggage handler’s involvement with
narcotics at New York’s John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK Airport). ICE agents obtained
judicial authorization to wiretap Jorge Espinal’s
phone and discovered that the baggage handler was
working with Henry Polanco, a narcotics distributor
based in New York. Espinal told Polanco that, as
a luggage-ramp supervisor at the airport, he could
intercept packages containing narcotics on Delta
planes and prevent them from being screened by
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents. For
his part, Polanco arranged for a Dominican Republic supplier to hide packages containing cocaine,
heroin, and ecstasy on many Delta flights; six packages were eventually seized by CBP agents.
The drug smuggling was not without incident. On
February 11, 2006, CBP agents seized a backpack
with cocaine and heroin from a Delta flight from
the Dominican Republic to New York. Not realizing
that CBP agents had the backpack, Espinal informed
Polanco that the backpack had ended up on the international baggage carousel and then was taken to
unclaimed baggage. The Dominican supplier, meanwhile, suspected that Espinal and Polanco had stolen
the drugs and demanded either the return of the drugs
or payment for the loss. When Espinal learned that the
backpack had been seized, he informed the Dominican
supplier that his girlfriend worked for the government
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and had access to confidential information that would
prove that the seizure actually occurred.
The girlfriend—Elizabeth Moran-Toala—worked
as a CBP officer from 2003 to 2007 at Hollywood
International Airport in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
Her job required her to review flight manifests to
identify airline passengers who were suspected of
criminal activity. In that role, Moran-Toala had
access to the Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) database for work-related use.
She was prohibited from browsing for personal or
other non-work-related reasons. Three days after
the backpack was seized in New York, she used the
TECS database to access the seizure report.
In another incident, agents learned from the wiretap that Espinal and Polanco had arranged for a drug
mule, Henry Cabrera, to carry a suitcase containing
narcotics on an August 24, 2007, Delta flight from
the Dominican Republic to JFK Airport. While waiting for Cabrera’s plane to land so they could arrest
him, agents saw Espinal attempt to enter a sterile area
where they suspected he planned to collect the suitcase
before Cabrera went through customs. However, those
plans were foiled when Espinal was scared off by the
heavy law enforcement presence. Espinal informed
Polanco that he was unable to meet Cabrera and did
not know what happened to the suitcase. This time it
was Polanco who suspected that Espinal had stolen
the drugs. Once again, Espinal said that he would contact his girlfriend to provide confirmation that police
had, indeed, intervened. Five days later, Moran-Toala
used the TECS database to access a record of Cabrera’s arrest. Telephone records revealed that she called
Espinal’s airport work station the next day.
Three days after she accessed the TECS database to
check on Cabrera, Moran-Toala used the database to
determine whether another associate of Espinal’s, Victor Perez, had any outstanding warrants. The search
revealed none, and telephone records showed two
outgoing calls from Moran-Toala’s phone to Espinal.
The government charged Moran-Toala in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York with conspiracy to import more
than one kilogram of heroin and more than five kilograms of cocaine (count one), and with conspiracy to
use a government computer unlawfully (count two).
While awaiting trial on the New York charges,
Moran-Toala pleaded guilty in the Southern District of Florida to involvement in a separate heroin
importation and distribution conspiracy. That conspiracy included her sister and brother-in-law, who
were officers of the CBP and Transportation Security Administration. Moran-Toala admitted that
she used the TECS system to run travel checks for
drug couriers flying out of Fort Lauderdale and to
access a seizure report to prove to a supplier that a
shipment was seized, not stolen.
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The New York Trial Instructions

In the New York case, Moran-Toala admitted to
misusing her CBP computer, but claimed that she
had no knowledge of the drug activity on the part of
Espinal and Polanco. The trial judge in New York,
after initially hesitating, decided to admit the signed,
written plea allocution in the Florida case pursuant
to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). The judge gave
the following instruction to the jury:
If you determine, in respect to count two, that
the defendant is guilty of that count, you must
determine whether the government has proved
beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that the offense
in [18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(B)(ii)] was committed in furtherance of a criminal act in violation
of the Constitution and laws of the United
States; namely, the conspiracy to import narcotics as charged in count one. It’s linked to
count one if you find she is guilty.

The phrase in furtherance means with the
intent to help, advance, move forward, promote or facilitate. The government must
therefore show that the defendant engaged
in the conduct of accessing the United States
Department of Homeland Security computer
in excess of authorization, with the intent to
advance, move forward, promote or facilitate
the conspiracy charged in count [one] about
which I’ve already instructed you.
(Moran-Toala, 726 F.3d at 339–40 (first alteration
omitted).)
The trial judge also provided the jury with a verdict sheet containing four “questions”:
1. Verdict on count one.
2. Amount of heroin and cocaine involved in the
conspiracy, if any.
3. Verdict on count two.
4. “Was the [unlawful computer use] conspiracy
in furtherance of the crime charged in Count
One, namely, the conspiracy to import a controlled substance?” (Id. at 340.)

Jury Questions

During the first day of deliberations, the jury sent
the judge a note that asked, “Count 2: must the verdict in #4 be in agreement with Count #1?” (Id.) The
jury was asking whether the findings it would use to
answer question 4 had to be consistent with its verdict
on count one. The trial judge consulted with counsel.
The prosecution urged a “no” answer, arguing that
Moran-Toala could have intended to have exceeded

her computer authority in furtherance of the narcotics conspiracy without having enough knowledge to
be a member of the conspiracy. Defense counsel urged
a “yes” answer to foreclose the possibility of inconsistent verdicts. The trial judge’s initial reaction was
that the defense was correct, but ultimately he told
the jury that its verdict on count one and the felony
enhancement did not have to be “in agreement.” The
jury returned its verdict about 20 minutes after getting
the judge’s response to its note. It acquitted MoranToala of the narcotics conspiracy, but convicted her
of conspiring to unlawfully access a computer in furtherance of the same narcotics conspiracy.

Post-Trial Motion

Moran-Toala filed a post-trial motion pursuant to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 to set aside
the jury’s enhancement finding. The trial judge concluded that the jury’s verdict was inconsistent.
While there may be scenarios in which an individual can act in furtherance of a conspiracy
without joining the conspiracy, there is no view
of the evidence in this particular case that would
permit that conclusion. The government’s theory at trial was that Moran-Toala would, at a
co-conspirator’s request, periodically access
confidential information regarding narcotics seizures and other information and pass it on to the
coconspirator. . . . By finding that Moran-Toala
committed the conspiracy computer offense
“in furtherance of the crime charged in Count
one,” the jury necessarily determined that she
had agreed with another—her co-conspirator
on the computer charge—to commit the crime;
that she had intentionally advanced the narcotics
conspiracy; and that she had committed an overt
act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Put simply, Moran-Toala could not have intentionally
misused her computer to advance a narcotics
conspiracy without being a member of that
conspiracy. Thus, when the jury asked whether
the special verdict on the [felony] enhancement
needed to be “in agreement” with its verdict on
count one, it was effectively asking whether the
verdict had to be consistent.
(Moran-Toala, 726 F.3d at 340–41.)
But the judge also concluded that even if the
court’s error produced the inconsistency, MoranToala was not entitled to relief.

The Appeal

The court of appeals first noted that because the
jury acquitted the defendant on count one, the
double jeopardy clause barred any retrial of the
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defendant on that count, regardless of the correctness of the verdict or whether it was a consistent
verdict. The court cited not only Dunn but also its
decision in United States v. Acosta, 17 F.3d 538 (2d
Cir. 1994), for the proposition that inconsistent
verdicts are unreviewable on appeal. But the court
noted that Moran-Toala was challenging the judge’s
“no” instruction to the jury in response to its question rather than simply focusing on inconsistency.
The court observed that the judge initially and
correctly explained to the jury that its verdict on the
narcotics conspiracy should be “linked” to its findings
on the felony enhancement because the felony enhancement only applied if Moran-Toala unlawfully used her
CBP computer with the intent to further the conspiracy. The court opined that the jury clearly recognized
the tension between acquittal on count one and an
affirmative answer to question 4 and that the trial judge
essentially blessed the jury’s desire to be inconsistent.
The court concluded that, had the judge answered
“yes” to the jury’s question and had the jury nonetheless returned an inconsistent verdict, the jury’s act
would have been one of nullification; but the judge’s
“no” answer to the jury effectively invited the jury
to nullify the law and misled the jury as to its duty.

Nature of the Error

The court ultimately concluded that the judge’s erroneous “no” answer to the jury did not amount to
“structural error,” which always requires reversal.
Citing Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57 (2008), the
court reasoned that a harmless error analysis applies
to instructional errors unless an error categorically
vitiates all the jury’s findings, and concluded that
the erroneous “no” should be subject to harmless
error review. The court explained the difficulty in
assessing the effect of the error:
Harmless error review in this case is complicated by the factual, if not legal, inconsistency
in the jury’s verdicts. The very reason such verdicts are unreviewable in and of themselves is
because we could do no more than “try to guess
which of the inconsistent verdicts is the one the
jury really meant.” We might speculate as to
what the jury actually had in mind in order to
seek to reconcile the two verdicts: perhaps the
jury found that Moran-Toala had insufficient
knowledge of the narcotics conspiracy to support a conviction on Count One, in which case
a properly instructed jury likely would have also
rejected the felony enhancement. Or the jury
might have found that Moran-Toala’s intent to
further the narcotics conspiracy by misusing
her CBP computer also proved her membership
in the narcotics conspiracy, but it did not wish

to convict on such a serious charge without
evidence that she personally imported or sold
drugs; in that case, a properly instructed jury
likely would have applied the felony enhancement. The problem with either speculation,
though, beyond the fact that they are speculations, is that they do not account for the jury’s
query: “Count 2: must the verdict in #4 be in
agreement with Count #1?” This note strongly
suggests that the jury itself could not reconcile
the verdicts on the two counts and was seeking
(and obtained) permission to render its contemplated verdicts despite the inconsistency.

There is thus no serious doubt that the
erroneous instruction contributed to any
inconsistency in the verdicts inasmuch as it
explicitly permitted them. We are not unaware
of the fact that the district court’s instruction
ultimately resulted in a highly favorable verdict for Moran-Toala, who was convicted of
the less serious charge and acquitted of the
more serious one. But, in light of the dearth
of evidence of Moran-Toala’s knowledge of
the Espinal-Polanco airport conspiracy, it is
nevertheless possible that a jury would have
acquitted her of the narcotics conspiracy and
declined to apply the felony enhancement had
the supplemental instruction been correct and
informed the jury that inconsistent verdicts
are impermissible. We therefore cannot say
with any confidence that it is clear beyond a
reasonable doubt that a properly instructed
jury would have convicted Moran-Toala of
felony-level unlawful computer access conspiracy. Accordingly, the conviction on Count Two
must be vacated and the case remanded to the
district court for retrial, should the government be inclined to pursue the charge.
(Moran-Toala, 726 F.3d at 344–45 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).)

The Lesson

The lesson of the case is clear. Whether courts
and judges like it or not, juries have the ability to
engage in a type of jury nullification by returning
inconsistent verdicts. The law is well established
that courts will not review such verdicts and set
aside convictions because a jury compromised. But
courts will not knowingly encourage nullification,
and if they do the encouragement is reviewable and
may, as in Moran-Toala, result in the setting aside
of a conviction when it is too difficult to ascertain
what the jury would have done absent the improper
judicial encouragement. n
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